Among debated issues in theology (science of kalām) is the rationality or religiousness of the sible when different laws are passed on it.recognition of the value of human deeds and conducts, which is referred to as rational or legal good and evil. Theologians have set forth the question as to whether maltreatment of animals is something regarded by intellect as indecent and evil or the recognition of such an issue is subject to examining the divine (the lawmaker’s) commands, in which case an action can be permissible or impermis
Violating animals’ rights and maltreating them is among the issues that few people doubt about its indecency and ugliness. Even those considered as pioneers of violating animals’ domains and those treating them cruelly, on most occasions do not deny this reality, and view their profiteering or pleasure seeking as the reason for perpetrating such behavior.
Accordingly, the Muslim thinkers are facing the question as to what is the origin of such judgment? Why is cruel treatment of animals considered as undesirable and indecent to people?
In theological explorations, we find three different answers to this question:
1. Intellectual Discernment
On the basis of their intellectual approach to the theological issues, the Mu‘tazilite and Shī‘ī theologians claim that the objects and actions have real expedience and evil or benefit and loss (inherent good and evil) despite any external matter, and that human intellect has the ability to perceive it (rational good and evil) without needing any factor for help.
What is meant by inherent good and evil is that the act of any learned and able creature that freely chooses its work is either essentially beautiful or essentially ugly; i.e., the intellect would discern its beauty or ugliness without getting help from other sources (al-mustaqillāt al-‘aqliyya = rational independents).
Such an approach paved the way for setting forth the thought among the Mu‘tazilites and the Shi’as that the impermissibility of maltreating animals results from the independent perception of the intellect of its evil. This judgment of the intellect is so transparent and decisive that some have regarded it as among the intellect’s inherent judgments, and regarded its denial the same as denial of the intellect’s essential judgment.
As a result of accepting this rational judgment, any act leading to the maltreatment of animals is permissible when we have a specific reason – rational or legal – for its permissibility.
In response to the question as to why God has on some instances permitted man to maltreat animals in order to utilize them despite the explicit judgment of intellect on the impermissibility of maltreating them, the Mu‘tazilite and Shī‘ī theologians have pointed out three justifications:
1.1. Expenses Rendered by Human Being: There is no doubt that keeping animals would cost much for a person, because by agreeing to take care of an animal – as it will be explained later – that person undertakes to provide food, water, sanitation, treatment, and a place for keeping it.
Since man has no essential obligation to animals for providing these expenses and services, he is normally entitled to use the animal for his own benefit in return; however, the amount of services that man provides to the animals is much more than the benefits he gains from utilizing them. Thus, by recognizing this human entitlement, common sense gives man permission to utilize the animals, even though this utilization would lead to their maltreatment.
1.2. Hereafter Reward: According to theological doctrines, God grants benefits to His creatures through one of the following three states: granting benefits without (the creature’s) doing good (tafdil = favoring); granting benefits for the unpleasant events (recompense); and granting benefits for obeying the commands (reward).
As per the theory of “recompense in the Hereafter”, which is the most prevalent theory in Islamic theological texts, God will reward (recompense) animals in the Hereafter for the maltreatment they suffer from being utilized by human beings. Thus, God would recompense in the Hereafter the injustice, which He prepared the ground for in this world by creating the creatures.
1.3. Evaluative Comparison: According to a group of theologians, to determine the evil of maltreating the animals, the amount of the profit that this maltreatment would entail for man or for the animal itself has to be taken into account. Then judgment is to be made about the good or the evil of the action through an evaluative comparison between the profit and the maltreatment.
On this basis, if the amount of the profit that a person gains from using an animal exceeds the amount of the damage or maltreatment that the animal suffers for it, or if the amount of the benefit that the animal gains from human treatment or it is more than the amount of the maltreatment that the animal suffers from that same treatment, then this type of use or treatment is rationally sound and permissible and the religion approves it.
One day, in my presence, a man asked Imam al-Sadiq (A.S.) about cutting off a sheep’s testicles. The Imam answered: “There is no prohibition against cutting them if you may improve your belonging thereby.”
1.4. Imagining the Ultimate End: According to this theory, for the maltreatment of animals and the judgment on its rational permissibility, we have to look for the goal and ultimate result of such an action.
If one follows a rational purpose in maltreating animals, the intellect regards such a maltreatment as proper and permissible; but if one maltreats animals aimlessly (in vain) or for an irrational purpose (playfully), the intellect would similarly assert its judgment as to the impermissibility and indecency of such an action.
This kind of imagining the ultimate end can be found in the sayings of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.), too; because he regards the killing (slaughtering) of a pregnant or nursing animal as abhorring only if it is with no reason.
Ibn Idrīs Ḥillī, Sarakhsī, and Ibn al-Munīr have proved the rational legitimacy of castrating, slaughtering, and forcing animals to do hard tasks.
Similarly, in rejecting the saying of Abū Hanifa who regarded the ish‘ār of a camel as a kind of torture and hence impermissible, ‘Allāma Hillī and Ibn Qudāma argue that although this action would hurt the camel, it is proper and permissible because it is motivated by a proper purpose (hurting for a true intention).
Although ish‘ār in the laws of Hajj rituals and its relation to maltreatment of animals is a legal rather than theological issue, some points need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, ish‘ār is applicable only to camels and not to cattle or sheep; secondly, the ish‘ār of camel is permissible only when it has a hump, that is to say it has fat tissues which lack pain sensors, so a camel that does not have a hump may not be marked through ish‘ār. Thirdly, doing ish‘ār on the cows lacking humps is debated among the jurisprudents.
With this explanation, both Abū Hanifa’s statement and the responses by ‘Allāma Ḥillī and Ibn Qudāma do not sound right, because in both cases the issue of maltreating a camel by practicing ish‘ār is taken for granted; whereas the fat tissues of the camel’s hump lack pain sensors and the camel does not feel any pain by receiving ish‘ār so discussion about the maltreatment of animals and having a proper intention for it do not rise.
In some theological texts, this kind of imagining the ultimate end in the permissibility of maltreatment of animals is referred to as luṭf (favor). The rule of luṭf, as one of the significant theological rules, is based on the indecency of [presuming] violation of intention by the All-wise Allah. Accordingly, since maltreatment of animals without recompense is injustice and maltreating them in return for recompense but without any goal is pointless and none of which is permissible to God, maltreatment of animals in the context of human beings profiting from them would be permissible according to the dictates of intellect.
When comparing these two theories, we should note that according to the third theory the sum total of the benefit and loss of the action, regardless of the impact of the agent’s motivation, is the criteria for the correctness and incorrectness of hurting the animal. In the fourth theory, however, the agent’s motivation, irrespective of the degree of the benefit or loss, delineates the correctness and incorrectness of the torture of the animal.
Anyway, the reconciliation of the last two theories can bring us to the conclusion that the maltreatment of animals is impermissible in two cases. First, when it is injustice, i.e., when there is neither benefit, nor it may prevent from further loss. Second: when it is pointless, i.e., when it is lacking a recompense of equal weight to it or more beneficial, it does not fend off any loss, causes depravity (i.e., it brings along evil and distracts from good). In contrast, hurting of animals is regarded as a permissible act only when it is beneficial or prevents from a greater loss.
2. Religious Laws
In contrast to the Mu‘tazilites and Shī‘as, the Ash‘arite theologians, denying the existence of the intellect’s innate perceptions (inherent good and evil), believe that human wisdom is too weak to judge on the good and evil of actions; rather, it is the religious teachings that we should turn to for perceiving it. (Good is what the lawmaker regards good and evil is what the lawmaker considers evil).
Accordingly, the Ash‘arites have discussed about the maltreatment of animals, maintaining that hurting the animals is not rationally indecent. They argue that if a conduct is impermissible according to the dictates of intellect, it should be so everywhere and for everybody as the inherent does not change; whereas, God has allowed human beings in some cases to treat animals in such a way that may hurt them.
In view of the Ash‘arites the best reason for the maltreatment of animals not to be rationally impermissible is the differences among the intellectuals in this respect, for this disagreement results from the lack of rational necessity in the evil of such an act. Supposing we accept that the intellect considers maltreatment of animals as evil, but since God has given man permission for such behavior, the intellect has to give in by accepting God’s Omniscience and consider animal maltreatment as permissible, as well. Therefore, maltreatment of animals is rationally evil so long as God has not permitted man for it, but after that, it is no longer evil.
Some Ash‘arite theologians have gone beyond this and claimed that even where the intellect – presumably – deems animal maltreatment as impermissible, it is because God has in those instances prohibited us from performing it; otherwise, the intellect has no capability to understand its evil.
Conclusion: According to the Ash‘arites, God can persecute the animals with no crime and may not give them reward in the world and in the Hereafter without its being called “injustice”; for, God is the absolute master and possessor of the world of being and its creatures and injustice is imaginable only when a person takes possession of another person’s property without permission. However, the wisdom and the true reason of such treatment by God is not clear for us and we do not know He has created the world of being in such a way that a group of creatures would suffer so much torment and persecution in their life.
Now that such treatment by God in maltreatment of animals is not unjust, He can also give permission to mankind to maltreat animals in the best of their interest without such treatments being considered as indecent or injustice.
3. Sensual Affections
In contrast to the two rationalistic Mu‘tazilite-Shī’ite and irrationalistic Ash‘arite theological trends, there are certain renowned philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, Khawja Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī, ‘Umar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī, and Muhaqqiq Isfahānī (Kompānī) who maintain that the difference of the theologians in the perception and imperception of good and evil is based on accepting the principle that judgment about the good or evil is among the judgments of the theoretical reason; whereas, [the judgment concerning] the good and evil of the objects and actions includes in judgments of the practical reason. Thereupon, such propositions as “justice is good” or “injustice is evil” are beyond certainty and regarded as among the generally accepted (mashhūr) uncertain propositions.
The corollary of such a thought is that judging on the evil of maltreatment of animals is not a judgment based on intellectual perception but it results from certain human tendencies and inner qualities such as kindness and compassion.
A Critical Review: Although critically reviewing the reasons of the Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites for accepting and denying the intrinsic good and evil of actions, particularly the maltreatment of animals as an example of that general precept, demands another chance to deal with, it is to be noted that īlām (inflicting pain) is not evil simply for being īlām; because nothing would be characterized as evil (qubh) because of its own essence (genus). Therefore, maltreatment of animals can be evil (qabih) only when it is characterized by “injustice”, just as it can be good (hasan) if characterized by “justice”.
Parity of good and evil with justice and injustice, hence, the lawfulness and unlawfulness are among the issues that the Holy Qur’ān has emphasized in its various verses.
﴾Say, “My Lord has only forbidden indecencies, the outward among them and the inward ones.”﴿
﴾Indeed Allah enjoins justice and kindness and generosity towards relatives, and He forbids indecency, wrong, and aggression.﴿
﴾…who bids them to do what is right and forbids them from what is wrong, makes lawful to them all the good things and forbids them from all vicious things.﴿
﴾When they commit an indecency, they say,” We found our fathers practicing it, and Allah has enjoined it upon us.” Say, “Indeed Allah does not enjoin indecencies.”﴿
Consequently, if an animal is utilized in accordance to its creation, no injustice is perpetrated rationally so that the judgment of religion for the permissibility of using that animal in that respect be a breach of the judgment of intellect as to the evil of maltreatment of animals. In other words, the exclusions in the intellectual judgments is an unreal presumption, as the lawmaker, by virtue of intellect and his behavior based on intellect, would never make a judgment contrary to reason (whatever reason judges, the canonical law – shar‘ – would judge, too). As a result, we would not encounter any law in the Islamic rules and ordinances that, contrary to the intellectual judgment of the impermissibility of maltreating animals
#299;lām and ta‘dhīb), would permit man a conduct that would cause the maltreatment of animals.
Notice the context of the following verse: ﴾He created the cattle, in which there is warmth for you and [other] uses and some of them you eat…. And they bear your burdens to towns which you could not reach except by straining yourselves. Indeed your Lord is most kind and merciful. And horses, mules and asses, for you to ride them.﴿
In this verse, God has pointed out some ways man can use animals: 1. Using their hide and wool for clothing, 2. Using their meat for food, 3. Carrying loads, and 4. Riding.
Thus, killing (slaughtering) animals for their hide or meat as well as transporting goods or people by them is not injustice; rather, it is using them in line with their creation. So, the judgment by religion as to the permissibility of slaughtering the animals or the like cannot be regarded as a judgment contrary to the judgment of intellect or an exception to it.
For this reason, the Muslim jurists have asserted that drying silkworm cocoons by sun’s heat is permissible, as without which the intended purpose for the creation of silkworm will not be fulfilled, even though the worm may thus be killed.
Normally, if this utilization is in line with the animals’ creation, maltreatment no longer applies to it; however, it does not mean that the animal never gets hurt and pain through human utilization.
Therefore, some theologians’ claim that the denial of pain in animals is pointless or denial of God’s intervention in maltreating animals is a denial of an evident matter, cannot be true, because God has made the animals’ bodies in such a way that human beings can use them to their benefit and if they perform it in the right way, the animal would not undergo any pain. For this reason, some believe that the method proposed by Islam for slaughtering animals would not entail any pain for the animal, because by the abrupt cutting of the [four] arteries and the sudden outflow of the blood from its body the animal’s nervous system stops working and no pain is felt thereafter.
This issue, to be discussed later on in our legal deliberations, has unfortunately been neglected in both Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite theological trends. They have, in their negligence, attempted by raising various theories to either justify animal maltreatment in line with Divine justice like the Mu‘tazilites, or bring up the issue of precedence of faith over reason and deny the reason’s perception in the good and evil of the matters like Ash‘arites.
Reference:
Animals Welfare Acts and Utilization Limits in Islam
Author: Saeid Nazari Tavakkoli
Translated by: Ahmad Rezwani
Islamic Research Foundation
Astan Quds Razavi, Mashhad – Islamic Republic of Iran
Imam Reza’s treatment of animals
It is related that a perplexed and frightened sparrow came twittering near Imam al-Reza(A.S.). The Imam (A.S.) said, “Do you know what it is saying?” “No”, they said. He said, “It is telling me that a snake is about to eat its offspring in the house. Stand up and take this rod, go to the house and kill the snake.” I [the narrator of the hadith] stood up, took the rod, and entered the house. I saw a snake moving around in the house and killed it.
I said to Imam al-Reza(A.S.), “I had a sheep that I had fattened for offering as sacrifice. When I took it and laid down, it looked at me and I felt pity for it. Yet, after a while, I slaughtered it.” Imam al-Reza(A.S.) said, “I wish you had not done it; do not slaughter the animal that you have bred yourself.”
One of the treatments that can spiritually torment animals is leaving them with children. Although playing with small animals and certain birds is pleasing for children, it is not desirable since it tortures them.
It was on this basis that Imam al-Reza(A.S.) advises his companions not to even leave a lark with children to play with.
